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Abst rac t - -We describe here a model for inheritance reasoning baaed on the notion that a type can 
be described by two basic sets of characteristics--those that are necessary for the type and those 
that axe typical for the type. All possible combinations of characteristics form a boolean lattice 
in which type descriptors can be placed relative to one another. Common lattice propertiem (such 
am transitivity of ~) combined with a default assumption operation form the basis for a theory o/" 
deJ'easible reasoning in inheritance networks. This paper gives a careful, but informal overview of 
the model, with several exarnple~ and many diagrams. For a more formal treatment, he interested 
reader is referred to the final chapters of [1]. The model allows a natural representation a d a clean 
reasoning mechanism, at the same time as it adequately captures many of our intuitions regarding 
conclusions. It is also able to express ome interesting nuances which are not available in other 
theories. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Classification into categories and sub-categories, along with default or tentative reasoning about 
tile properties of objects within these categories, is a common human activity. It allows for 
continuation of the reasoning process in situations where people could otherwise be paralyzed by 
lack of information, or by the overwhelming number of theoretical possibilities. 
There have been a number of systems built which attempt o capture the notion of inlteritance 
from super to sub-types, and to simulate human reasoning regarding characteristics of objects 
known to belong to a certain type. Many of these are based on the notion of semantic nets 
for capturing the representation f information. Some well known examples are NETL [2] and 
TMOIS [3]. 
llowever, the semantics of these systems is often based on intuitions, causing a number of 
problems. In some early systems uch as NETL, the shortest path algorithm wl, ich initially 
seemed plausible for deciding in cases where multiple inheritance and exceptions caused conflict, 
later was shown to be incorrect. A number of attempts have been made to overcome this problem, 
however, there is still a considerable 'clash of intuitions' [4] regarding what is in fact a correct 
behaviour. 
The theory we present is based on the formalism of a lattice and the mathematical lattice 
semantics, enriched with operations for making default assumptions. Our model allows for rep- 
resentation of information we believe people typically use in reasoning about defaults [5], and is 
not representable in other systems. The basic model is quite simple and yet it allows solutions to 
many of the classical problems in inheritance reasoning in a clear and consistent manner, without 
resorting to more complex inference mechanisms to deal with special situations. A number of 
issues which are discussed on the basis of differing intuitions are decided clearly within our model. 
The question of course remains as to whether the theory adequately captures human reasoning 
in this domain--whether the results match our intuitions. However, it seems that at least on the 
simple classical examples from the literature the results match ours, and some others' intuitions. 
By representing information ot usually represented in other inheritance reasoning frameworks 
(or by representing the same information differently) we are able to make some statements hat 
others cannot make, which can then be used in the reasoning process. 
We introduce here a simple example to illustrate the problems that typically arise in inheritance 
reasoning within semantic nets. We then describe our model, along with further examples. 
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1.1. Example 
Fahlman [2] originally surmised that a shortest path test was adequate for obtaining correct 
conclusions in networks with exceptions. An example of where this method works is in reasoning 
about a Cephalopod and a Nautilus, given the NETL network shown in Figure 13. However, 
Touretzky [4] presents the network shown in Figure la as the sort of example that causes hortest 
path reasoning algorithms to fail, and is thus a justification for his shortest inferential distance (or 
on-path preemption) algorithm. In Figure la the positive and the negative path from Clyde to 
Grey Thing are the same length (2 links, either via Elephant or via Royal Elephant) and therefore 
a shortest path algorithm will not choose the Royal Elephant path. The gist of Touretzky's 
algorithm is that Clyde is not a Grey Thing in Figure la, because he is a Royal Elephant 
and Royal Elephant is between Clyde and Elephant and is therefore more specific and blocks 
inheritance from Elephant. However, the algorithm does not rely directly on specificity but on 
a notion of pre-emption, so that a path from a more specific node preempts a path from a less 
specific node, but only if the path into the less specific node originates from a node which is itself 
on a path between the object and the more specific node. In this example the requirement is 
that for a path through elephant to be pre-empted the link into elephant must originate from a 
node on the path from Clyde to Royal Elephant (including the node Clyde itself). 
Grey Thi i ' 
i : 'w  
Royal j 
Elephant I j 1 
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Figure 1. A simple problematic irdmritance problem. 
Sandewal[ [6], however, claims that shortest inferential distance is also inadequate as it fails in 
the example given in network Ib, to draw the same conclusion as in Diagram In--namely that 
Clyde is non-grey. Sandewall proposes an algorithm which Touretzky [4] refers to as off-path 
preemption in order to obtain the same result in Ib as Ia. The conditions for one path pre- 
empting another are here less strict though more complex (they are given clearly in [7]). They 
allow for the path through African Elephant and Elephant o also be pre-empted by the path 
through Royal Elephant, despite the fact that African Elephant does not lie on the path between 
Clyde and Royal Elephant (hence the name off-path pre-emption). 
In Figure lc we see the same network as lb but with different labelling on the nodes. This 
example is given by Touretzky who argues that, with the changed labeling, it is no longer in- 
tuitively clear what conclusions we wish to draw. Thus he argues that on-path, rather than 
off-path pre-emption is the correct approach, and networks uch as lb and lc should indeed 
yield an ambiguous result regarding whether Clyde is grey, or, respectively, whether George is a 
beerdrinker. 
The disturbing fact, however, is that a person given the information in Diagram Ib would 
almost certainly say that Clyde is non-grey. At the same time the diagrammatically equivalent 
example in lc would produce a much more uncertain response. The model we are about to 
describe naturally allows these two situations to be represented differently, thus resulting in 
different reasoning regarding the two examples. 
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2. LATT ICE  TYPING MODEL 
The primary innovation in our model is that we see a type as consisting of two sets of char- 
acteristics, and therefore two nodes in a network. These sets of characteristics build a lattice, 
allowing lattice relationships and properties between odes. A semantic net with strict links can 
also be used for representation, but the underlying lattice guides the reasoning process. 
2.1. Types 
The process of typing can be seen as the giving of names to groupings of characteristics so 
that we recognize the characteristics a belonging together. These characteristics then more or 
less describe objects that belong to the type associated with the set of characteristics. Not all 
instances of a type have all of the characteristics that belong to the type description. However, 
the more characteristics from the type description that can be found in a given instance, the 
more typical the instance is seen to be. This approach to categorization has been developed 
within psychology, and is known as the featural approach to category names [8]. A number of 
psychological studies in linguistics upport the notion that people's internal representation of
categories i in terms of prototypes which group together characteristic features [5]. 
Smith, Shoben and Rips [9] suggest hat a semantic procedure for a type name, such as bird, 
consists of tests for what they call defining features and characteristic features. Defining features 
are those features which must he present for all members of the category, whereas characteristic 
features are features of the typical or prototype member of the category. 
In keeping with this psychological view of typing, we define a type, formally, as two sets of 
features. The first set of features we call the type default. This contains the characteristic features 
of the type; those characteristics that we think of when we say the type name. The second set 
of features we call the type core. The type core is a subset of the type default, and is the set 
of defining features for the type, those features that are necessarily required to be present in all 
instances of the type. t
When we describe a particular category we often do it in terms of other categories, (e.g., an 
apple is a fruit with edible skin.. .) .  The use of the type name fruit here, chunks together a whole 
set of characteristics a a single feature. This chunking is critical for human comprehension a d 
management of information and is also important for computer epresentations. 
Our representations of types, both cognitive and within the computer, almost always contain 
incomplete information. Often a large amount of the information which is represented is in the 
form of relationships between types. We explore now the different relationships which we use 
and represent within our typing model, and then explain how this information can be used in the 
reasoning process. 
2.2. Relationships Between Types 
We take the set of all features which could be used to describe objects or categories within 
the world. A feature can be seen as an attribute value pair such as (weight, 5 kg) or (edible, 
True), though we do not limit ourselves to this representation. It is not important o identify 
all members of the set--the important point is that it exists as a theoretical entity. We call this 
set C. Each subset of C is a feature descriptor. Some of these feature descriptors represent type 
cores and type defaults for different classes. Others may represent individual objects, or be just 
a random meaningless aggregation of characteristics. 
Feature descriptors can then be compared with each other according to the notion of more 
information. For example we can say that a feature descriptor A contains more information than 
a feature descriptor B, written A _~ B, if B _C A. 
The subsets of C (i.e., all possible feature descriptors) form a boolean lattice with the usual 
lattice theoretic join (least upper bound) U operator and meet (greatest lower bound) 13 operator. 
In a simple feature descriptor lattice where A ~ B means simply that the features in A are a 
x One may wish to allow exceptions even to the type core at the level of an individual ob jec twe.g . ,  a three-legged 
dog. However, a sub-category never contains exceptions to the core of its parent category. 
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superset of the features in B, then the join and meet relations are equivalent o union and 
intersection, i.e., 
AUB=AUB,  
AnB=ANB.  
There are other possibilities for characterising the lattice, but this is intuitively the simplest. In 
a lattice containing descriptors uch as weight 5-10 kg, which contains more information than 
(i.e., is -3) weight 5-20 kg, then the join of two descriptors i no longer simply equal to the union 
of the features in the two descriptors. The more general formal characterization is given in [1]. 
Type cores and defaults, being feature descriptors, can be compared with each other using :3 
and can be combined with each other using U and n to form new feature descriptors. These new 
feature descriptor .~may or may not represent the core or default of a type. 
The core for a type X, written X¢ is always C_ the type default for X, written Xd. If X, contains 
the defining cha:acteristics for X, then Xd is the union of these defining characteristics plus the 
typical chara,'teristics. Each individual characteristic can be represented by a point in the lattice 
of all feature descriptors. The join of X, with all such points, then gives Xd. For example if X 
contains three characteristics el, c2 and ca which are additional to the defining characteristics, 
then Xa can be expressed as X¢ U cl U c2 U ca. There are then points between Xc and Xd which 
exist within the lattice of feature descriptors but are not explicitly represented. When reasoning 
about typing, it is important o use these implicit points to enable drawing of conclusions. 2 
A type B can be said to be a subtype of a type A if 
• Bd _~ A¢, (B's are usually A's). 
This is the weakest possible subtype relationship, and can be expressed as B's are usually 
A's (though possibly not typical A's). Other nuances are: 
a Bd :3 Ad, (B's are usually typical .'.'s). 
• Bc ~ A~, (B's are always A's). 
• Bc _~ Ad, (B's are always typical A's). 
Within the set of all possible feature descriptors there exist some descriptors which are incon- 
sistent in that they contain incompatible characteristics and thus cannot possibly describe any 
object in the real world. An example of incompatible features would be the features weight 5 
kg and weighl 10 kg, as no object can be described by both these feature ~simultaneously. If
we express features in terms of attribute value pairs, then any two features describing the same 
attribute with conflicting values would be incompatible with each other. However, we do not 
limit ourselves to this case, but rather allow incompatability of featares to be arbitrarily de- 
fined. An inconsistent descriptor is then any descriptor containing at least two features which 
are incompatible. 
DEFINITION. IVe assume a relation I C C x C such that I(c,d) holds iff the characteristic c is 
i ncompat ib le  with the characteristic d. 
DEFINITION. The descriptor A is inconsistent,  written I(A), iff 3c,@ E A: I(c,c~). 
All descriptors which are type defaults, type cores, or describe individual objects are assumed 
to be consistent. If a type descriptor or object descriptor, say A, joined with a type descriptor 
B, is known to give an inconsistent descriptor, then we know that an object described by, or 
:3 A cannot also be :3 B. Thus we can say that A belongs to the set of things that are definitely 
NOT B's. The formal definition is as follows: a
DEFINITION. NOT(A)  -'- {B I I(A LI B) A- I (A)  AmI(B)}. 
Note that irA is inconsistent then NOT(A) is the empty set. 
(See Figure 2 for a graphical illustration of NOT(A)). 
SHow to use these points is explained in the section on modified default assumptions. 
3The NOT defined here cUrlers from the conventional logical "NOT"-M-lattlce-complement in the usual boolean 
lattice on setJ, in that it identifies a set of nodes rather than a specific node in the lattice. Our NOT depends on 
the incompatibility of(formally) arbitrary features. 
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~~coEaCh descriptor in this region 
n~ins at least one p~?f  
Al A ' ~  ~Al l  B'S 
"" "~B 
Figure 2. Illustration of fact that A's are NOT B's. 
PROPOSITION 1. A [Z B A [ (A)  .-* I(B). That is to say incompatibility in a descriptor is neces- 
sarily inherited by all more specific descriptors. 
PROOF. A I"- B implies A _C B. I(A) implies 3 e,c' 6 A: I(c,c'). Since A C_ B, then V c 6 A: c 6 
B, which implies 3 c,c' 6 B: [(c,d), which implies I(B). | 
PROPOSITION 2. I(A U 13) A (C ~_ A) A "[(C) A - [ (B)  "-'* C ff NOT(B). If  a descriptor A is 
incompatible with a descriptor B, then all consistent descriptors more specific than A belong to 
NOT(B). 
PROOf'. C _ A implies (A IA B) _.U (C IA B), which together with I(A LI B) implies I(C LIB), 
which together with -~I(C), ~I(B) implies C E NOT(B). l 
Incompatibility can of course occur between any combination of core and default type pairs, 
giving similar nuances in negative statements as in positive. Thus we can say: 
• A's are never B's, I(Ac LI Be). 
• Typical A's are never B's, I(Ad tJ Be). 
• A's are never typical B's, I(Ac II Be). 
* Typical A's are not typical B's, I(Ad LI Be). 
We can also show that if X is NOT a W, then X is not something which is a strict subtype 
of W. 
PROPOSITION 3. If X, Y, W, Z are type descriptors uch that Y E_ X, W C Z, and Y U W is 
incompatible, then X 6 NOT(Z). 
PROOf. X _~ Y implies X = X IA Y, and Z ~ W implies Z = Z t.l W. 
Therefore the following is satisfied: X 12 Z = (X IA Y) IA (g IJ W). 
Since I_1 is commutative and associative, we obtain X IA Z = (Y kl W) IA (X IA Z), which implies 
(X U Z) _~ (Y U W). 
Since Y U iV is incompatible and _ has been shown to preserve incompatibility, it follows that 
X U Z is incompatible which implies X 6 NOT(Z). 1 
If we have only relational information regarding a number of type descriptors, such as, for ex- 
ample, the information that a swallow is a bird and a bird is an animal, (i.e., the feature descriptor 
for swallow contains more information than the feature descriptor for bird, which contains more 
than the feature descriptor for animal) but no information or incomplete information regarding 
the actual features of the types, then we are not able to place the descriptors directly in our the- 
oretical lattice of feature descriptors. We do not know the exact combination of features which 
describes, e.g., a swallow, and therefore, cannot map to a particular lattice point. However, we 
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are able to place the types relative to one another within the lattice, building what we call a type 
schema. We know that swallow is above bird which is above animal. The type schema may also 
contain some information regarding the features of the types. For instance, we may well know 
that typical birds fly without knowing all features of typical birds. The type schema can then 
be used for reasoning about objects (or other type descriptors), regarding which we have some 
initial relational or feature information. 
Figure 3 illustrates placement of descriptors relative to one another, even though the exact 
placement in the lattice is unknown. 
~ "- approximate lattice region 
Figure 3. Relations between descriptors allow formation of type schema. 
2.3. Mapping to Network Representation 
It is possible to represent the type schema s a network, where the type core and default are 
nodes, and the more  in fo rmat ion  and incompat ib i l i ty  relations are two different link types. 
This gives a network of the sort shown in Figure 4. (The example here is the same as that used 
in Figure lb.) 4 
One can map traditional (e.g., NETL or TMOIS style) network representations, having a 
single node for each type, and default positive and negative links between nodes, (e.g. [2,3]) 
to our network representation, simply by having all links between types go from default nodes 
to core nodes. Network representations where all links are strict (e.g. [10]) can be mapped by 
having links go always from core to core. Networks with both strict and defensible link types, 
such as those used by Etherington [11] and Horty and Thomason [12], also have a direct and 
straightforward mapping. 
2.4. Reasoning [/sing the Type Schema 
The reasoning process can intuitively be seen as graph traversal plus two specially defined 
operations--a default assumption (written e) and a modified default assumption. The default 
assumption operation is a traversal from core to default of a type against the direction of the link, 
i.e., it is not motivated by the lattice structure itself, but is a separate, specially defined operator. 
The modified default assumption is a traversal from a type core to a modified type default which 
4The network k upeide down as compared to traditional type inheritance graphs. This is because it is more 
intuitive within our model to show more information (i.e., subtypes) as higher up. 
Defeasible inheritance 533 
KEY 
• Default 
• Core 
0 Object 
A I I ,~B =I (AUB)  
Clyde 
Royal I[I / ~  ~llAfrica n 
E leph~N ~ J /~  Elephant 
Figure 4. Lattice-based network representation. 
is well defined but not explicitly represented. This traversal is also in the opposite direction than 
the (implicit) link. The modified default contains less information than the full default and is 
explained further in Section 4. The symbol ~ is used to include both full and modified default 
assumptions. The graph representation contains only strict links, therefore monotonic reasoning 
from a given point can be described by following paths of directed positive links, with an optional 
bi-directional incomparability (negative) link at the end of a path. A negative link at the end of 
a path results in a negative conclusion regarding the final node. Additional negative monotonic 
conclusions can also be obtained regarding all nodes on paths into a node for which there is a 
negative conclusion. This is a result of the proof of Proposition 3 and is explained more fully 
in [13]. 
Potential conflicts are resolved by preferring tile more specific of two default assumptions. In 
simple cases the less specific assumption is simply not made, in more complex cases a modified 
assumption is made. In the case of interacting conflicts it is important that modifications for 
conflict resolution are done in the right order--most specific first and unambiguous situations 
before ambiguous ituations. Further details regarding this as well as a precise definition of 
specificity are given in [1]. 5 
o I I Clyde is an African Elephant 
Initial Monotonic [ Royal Elephant (African Elephant) is an [ 
I Elephant I 
I. Royal Elephants are NOT Grey Things [ 
1 
Default Assumption 2. Elephants are Grey Things 
I 
Conflict Resolution [ Remove assumption 2 as Royal Elephants are [ 
I more specific than Elephants. I 
Result I Clyde is a Royal Elephant, an African Elephant, [ 
I an Elephant and NOT a Grey Thing I 
Figure 5. Reasoning about Clyde. 
SThe specificity definition states that A is more specific than B if the def~dt assumption at A results in B, or 
if there is a c~ain of default ~sumptions starting from A which eventually result in B, as long as it is not also 
possible to conclude A fi'om B vi~ defmalt ~ssumptlons. 
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Taking as an example the Figure in Diagram 4, which is our representation f the example 
in Figure lb, we reason as in Figure 5. We follow the directed links to collect the information 
that Clyde is a Royal Elephant, an African Elephant and an Elephant. We then make default 
assumptions at Elephant and Royal Elephant, to obtain the information Grey Thing and NOT 
Grey Thing. This is dearly inconsistent, so we examine the default assumptions and observe that 
Elephant is a less specific default assumption than Royal Elephant (because Elephant is reachable 
from Royal Elephant). Consequently we remove our default assumption regarding Elephant and 
conclude that Clyde is a Royal Elephant, an African Elephant, an Elephant (though not a typical 
one) and is NOT a Grey Thing. 
3. FURTHER EXAMPLES 
We look first briefly at our representation f the examples hown in Figures la and lc (lb 
has already been covered). Our representation is shown in Figures 6 and 7. The reasoning for 
Figure 6 proceeds exactly as for the situation in Figure 4 (discussed above) except hat the initial 
situation of African E|ephant is missing (both from initial state and conclusion). No special 
methods are required to deal with the situation where African Elephant is added. 
i 
Clyde 
R oy t ? f 
E leph~'N~ JR 
t ~ Elcph:mt 
~ Grey Thing 
Figure 6. Lattice representation of la. 
George George 
• \ i - T Beer 
a b 
George 
" l IC  
an 
Beer 
er 
c 
Figure 7. Alternative lattice representations of lc. 
We see in Figure 7 that our representation allows a number of different representations of 
the information, depending on whether one regards Marines and Chaplains as always, or only 
typically, men. Such questions do not always have clear cut answers and the decision as to whether 
to assign a property to core or default may sometimes be a matter of judgement. However, certain 
relationships ( uch as Royal Elephants being Elephants) unequivocally belong to the core. Things 
such as four-leggedness can be discussed in that one can imagine an elephant with an amputated 
leg which is still an elephant. However, our approach is to keep such properties in the core, 
but allow individual instances to contain exceptions even to the core. e However, one may not 
create subclasses which are exceptions to the core, as the need to do this would indicate that 
eFormally the exceptional individual is then denoted by a point in the lattice below the core point, but containing 
all the non counter-indicated information of the core, just aa a modified default contai~ all the non cotmter- 
indicated information of the default. Modified defaults ate explained fully in a following section. 
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the characteristic(s) causing the exception should be moved to the default. In the example in 
Figure 4, one could have chosen to have the negative link between Royal Elephant and Grey Thing 
go from the core of Royal Elephant. This would simply have had the result of strengthening our 
conclusions in that the result would no longer rely on any default assumptions. 
Each of the alternative representations i  Figure 7 give the same default conclusion--namely 
that George is a not a beerdrinker--the differences are the number of default assumptions during 
the reasoning process. The intuition that Clyde being non-grey is somehow much more certain 
than George not being a beer-drinker is in our opinion a result of the fact that it would probably 
not be unreasonable to represent the Clyde example with the incompatibility link from core Royal 
Elephant, whereas the equivalent link from Chaplain much more clearly belongs to the default. 
3.1. Ambiguous Example 
i 
The example we explore here is the canonical ambiguous net {'the Nixon diamond') concate- 
nated with a net giving further ambiguities (from [4]). It is shown in Figure 8b, using standard 
network representation, and in 8c and 8d using two different choices of representation i  our 
model. 
Pacifist 
Repub l~aker  
Nixon 
Original Nixon diamond 
i i 
I ~ Anti 
Quaker 
I Republica 
Nixon 
l 
[ Extended Nixon diamond 
b 
Nixon 
R e p u b l i c @  Quaker 
Fan ~ ~ Military 
All Quakers arc Pacifists 
Nixon 
R e p u b l i c ~  Quaker 
• ~i f i s t  
F°°tbal~'~.._,N~ r Anti 
Fan ~ ~ Military 
Typical Quakers arc Pacifists 
c d 
i i i i 
Figure 8. Enhanced Nixon diamond. 
3.1.1. Quakers are always Pacifists 
In Figure 8c we represent all Quakers as being Pacifists, and all Pacifists as being anti-military, 
but only typical Republicans as being incompatible with Pacifists, and typical Football-Fans as 
being incompatible with Anti-Military. (This is in keeping with our intuitions as to how one 
would naturally set up such a type schema.) 
Using the reasoning process as previously (shown in Figure 9) we obtain a situation where the 
default assumption at Republican is in conflict with the certain conclusion that Nixon is a Pacifist. 
Thus we modify the default assumption at Republican so that the modified assumption o longer 
assumes the contraindicated incompatability with Pacifist, but does contain the independent 
assumption that a Republican is a Football-Fan. r The default assumption at Football-Fan is then 
in conflict with the certain conclusion that Nixon is Anti-Military, resulting in the withdrawal 
1'The mechanism for making modified efault aasumptiotm is explained inSection 4. 
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Given 
Initial Monotonic 
Default Assumption 
Conflict Resolution 
Result 
Nixon is a Quaker 
Nixon is a republican 
Quaker is a Pacifist 
Pacifist is an Anti Military 
I. Republican is (a) a Football 
Fan and Co) Anti Military. 
2. Football Fan is NOT Anti Military 
Modify assumptions 1 and 2 as they 
conflict with initial monotonic 
conclusions. 
Nixon is a Quaker, Republican, Pacifist, 
AntiMilitary and a Football Fan. 
Figure 9. Reasoning about Nixon using 8c. 
of that  default assumption. The conclusions are thus that Nixon is a Republican, a Quaker, a 
Pacifist, Anti-Mil itary and a Football-Fan. 
This disturbs our intuitions as Nixon is a particular individual whom we know to have been 
non-pacifist and non-anti-militaristic. This serves to illustrate tile point previously noted, that 
individuals must be allowed to fall even below the type core, where explicitly stated to do so. 
However, this does not justify the building of a hypothetical class of militaristic Quakers. 
Nixon is a Republican 
Given Ni×on is a Quaker 
I1. Quakers are Pacifists which are alwaysAnti Military. 
Default Assunptions 12 . Republicans are NOT Pacifists and are Football Fans. 
[ 3. Football Fans are NOT Anti Military. 
Conflict Resolution 
Case I 
Result Case I
Conflict resolution 
Case 2 
Result Case 2 
Conflict Resolution 
Case 3 
Result Case 3 
Prefer assumption 1 over assumption 2 thus modifying 
assumption 2 to give only Football Fan. prefer 
assumption 1 over  assumption 3.
Nixon is a Quaker, Republican, Pacifist, Anti Military 
and a Football Fan. 
prefer assumption I over assumption 2 as above. 
prefer assumption 3 over assumption 1.
Nixon is a Quaker, Republican, Football Fan and NOT 
Anti Military. 
PreFer assumption 2 over assumption 1.
Assumption 3 is then uncontested. 
Nixon is a Quaker, Republican, Football Fan and NOT 
Anti Military 
i I i I I 
Figure 10. Reasoning about Nixon uaing 8d. 
Given ! 
Default Assumptions 
Conflict Resolution 
Result 
Defeasible inheritance 
I 
Nixon is a Republican. Nixon is a Quaker. I 
1. Quakers are Pacifists which are always Anti Military. I 
2.Republicans are NOT Pacifists and are Football Fans. ] 
3. Football Fans are NOT Anti Military. { 
Modify assumption 1 with respect to assumption 2,
and 2 with respect to 1. Then modify 1 and 3 with 
respect to each other. 
Nixon is a Quaker, Republican and Football Fan. 
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Figure 11. Skeptical reasoning re anabiguous situation--8c. 
3.1.2. Typical Quakers are Pacifists 
In this representation we replace the original symmetry of the Nixon diamond by stating that 
only typical Quakers are Pacifists. Figure 10 shows the reasoning regarding the situation in 8d. 
There are two separate conflicts here---that between Republican and Quaker regarding being a 
Pacifist, and that between Quaker and Football-Fan regarding being Anti-Military. (Note that the 
conflict here is between Quaker and Football-Fan rather than Pacifist and Football-Fan, as Anti- 
Military is a certain consequence of Quaker in this representation.) Neither of these conflicts can 
be resolved using specificity, as we have done before. (Republican is not reactlable from Quaker 
using default assumptions, nor vice versa; Football-Fan is not reachable from Quaker or vice 
versa.) One approach is then to produce multiple extensions by breaking the reasoning in two at 
the conflict point and continuing separate paths of reasoning. As is shown in the diagram there 
are three separate cases for the conflict resolution, though case 2 and 3 yield the same conclusion. 
If we had represented the link from Pacifist to Anti-Military as weaker than we did (i.e., as 
Default(Pacifist) "7 Core(Anti-Military)) the second conflict would have been between Pacifist 
and Football-Fan, thus generating also an extension in which Nixon was Quaker, Republican, 
Football-Fan, Pacifist and NOT Anti-Military. 
The results above are consistent with Touretzky's description of a credulous reasoner, in that all 
of the most likely extensions are found. In order to obtain a skeptical reasoner, (i.e., producing 
only one extension by disbelieving both conclusions given an ambiguous ituation) we simply 
modify both default assumptions in an ambiguous conflict, (see Figure 11). s The result then 
would be that Yixon is a Republican, Quaker and Football-Fan. 9 
3.2. Nautilus Ezample 
In Figure 13 we show an example from Fahlman et al. [14]. We show it both represented as it 
is in NETL, and also with the more informative representation f Etherington, who uses a wider 
variety of link types. Etherington's link types have the meanings hown in Figure 12. 
The lattice representation comes directly from Etherington's network and does not contain 
any extra information that is intuitively assumed in choosing between core and default. The 
information is already implicit in Etherington's graph. Etherington claims that it is necessary to 
have this larger number of link types (i.e., larger amount of information), if one is to map to the 
default theory of Reiter, and thus advocates semantic networks with both strict and defeasible 
links [11]. Although our representation has only strict links, the same information content is 
captured using our core and default nodes. 
SThe order of conflict resolution is important in such cases--see [1] for details. 
9We note that this conclusion is different han that produced by Horty ef al. [7] who also include NOT Anti- 
Military in the skeptical conclusion. A fuller discussion of this difference and the reasons for it can be found 
i. [x]. 
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Default Assumptions 
Conflict Resolution 
Result 
Nautilus 
Nautilus is a Cephalopod, a Mollusc and a 
Shelltmarer. 
I. Cephalopods are NOT Shelibearers. 
2. Molluscs are $hellbearcrs. 
1 
E 
I 
Modify assumption 1 as it conflicts with initial 
monotonic conclusions. Conflict between 1
and 2 then disappears. 
Nautilus, Cephalopod, Mollusc, Shelibcarer. ] 
i iii i 
i 
Figure 14. Reasoning about a Nautilus using 13c. 
Reasoning about an individual Nautilus (Figure 14) we see that there is a conflict between the 
initial monotonic information associated with Nautilus and the default assumption associated 
with Cephalopod, as well as a conflict between default assumptions at Cephalopod and Mol- 
lusc. Initial monotonic information always overrides default assumptions resulting in a necessary 
modification of the default assumption regarding Cephalopod. Following this modification the 
(modified) default assumption associated with Cephalopod is no longer in conflict with that at 
Mollusc. 
The resulting conclusion is thus that an individual Nautilus is, with neither competing exten- 
sions nor with uncertain assumptions, a Cephalopod, a Mollusc and a Shellbearer. This is the 
same conclusion that would be reached using either NETL or Etherington's network representa- 
tion plus his mapping of this to Reiter's default logic. 
When we reason about an individual Cephalopod, however, we obtain a conflict between 
Cephalopod and Mollusc. This leads to a modified assumption at Mollusc as it is less specific 
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than Cephalopod. This conclusion is the same as that obtained by Etherington, but does not 
require specific information about which types are exceptional as does his model. The shortest 
path algorithm used in NETL also gives the same result in this example, but the algorithm has 
been shown to be faulty for other examples, e.g., that given in Figure la. 
4. MODIFIED DEFAULT ASSUMPTIONS 
We have previously mentioned the notion of modified default assumptions and these are ex- 
tremely important if our system is to draw the conclusions that we intuitively wish it to draw. 
If we know that an object belongs to a type A, but is atypical for A in one or a number of 
aspects, we are still willing to believe that it is typical in other unrelated aspects. If we consider 
the example shown in Figure 15 we can imagine the situation where we know that a particular 
elephant is not grey but still in a reasoning system we would expect o assume that it is a very 
large animal. In the lattice underlying Figure 15 there are six definable lattice points between 
Elephant core and Elephant default. 1° Using the abbreviations for each named point these six 
points are E U G, E U H, E U L, E U F, E U G U F, E U L U tl. When we make a modified default 
assumption regarding some particular elephant we want to assume that the feature descriptor for 
that elephant is _~ E but C the Elephant default. The above six points plus E are the known 
points in our lattice which fulfill this criterion. However, as we will see, not all are allowable as 
modified assumptions. 
In the reasoning process a modified default assumption represents a jump to an appropriate 
one of these default points. Sometimes revision may mean that we believe only the core, but in 
complex systems with much information regarding each type, the ability to use partial typicality 
is certainly important. 
It is of course important hat a default reasoning process produces a consistent belief set. 
Certain sets of conclusions which do not have explicit inconsistencies but are nevertheless in- 
consistent are avoided by requiring that modified default assumptions map to one of the lattice 
points between core and default. In the diagram in the lower left of Figure 16 we see an example 
of a possible inconsistent conclusion set. By believing B but not C we avoid explicit inconsistency. 
However, we have an implicit inconsistency due to the fact that B's are C's, so we would not 
wish to believe B and NOT C. We are (in our model) prevented from falling into this problem, 
as there is no lattice point X, such that X -I Ac, X "1 B, X ~ C. If we identify our object with a 
lattice point ~ B then that point is also _ C. 
It is also important hat our modified assumption be what we call grounded, where grounded 
has to do with a notion of well-motivated assumptions. Looking at Figure 16, lower right, we see 
a modification where we do not believe B or C but do believe D. There is in fact a lattice point 
which is between A¢ and Aj and is -1 D but 71 C, so the result is not inconsistent. However, 
we would question whether such a belief is well motivated. We essentially believe typical A's 
lOThere may well be more points but we do not have sufficient information to define them. We note also that 
EULUF=EULandEUGUH=EUG.  
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are D's because they are C's (which are D's). If we now have a somewhat less than typical A 
which is not a C, it is perhaps not especially intuitive to believe that this particular A is a D. 
Looking at Figure 15, an ungrounded assumption would result from the lattice point (E tJ ll). In 
our model we disallow such ungrounded assumptions, and thus only a subset of the lattice points 
between a core and default are allowable as modified assumption points. Intuitively, modified 
default assumptions can be constructed by disconnecting one or more branches from a default 
assumption, but never by removing only part of a branch. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have described a model for representing typing and how it can be used for defensible inheri- 
tance reasoning. The model is consistent with a body of psychological nd linguistic research [5,9] 
in representing types as collections of features, some of which are necessary, while others are typ- 
ical, but not strictly necessary. Compatibility with human representations would presumably 
facilitate the use of such a system by end-users. 
The model described here has greater expressiveness than network models for inheritance where 
the network has only two link types (e.g., [2,3]). This is due to the ability to discriminate as to 
what is definitely inherited, versus what is inherited in typical cases. Our model also provides 
a mathematical semantics for resolving some questions regarding such things as the correct be- 
haviour in conflict situations. Network models lack such a semantics and their algorithms are 
based on intuitions. 
The expressiveness of the model is similar to that of network models which allow for both strict 
and default link types (e.g., [11,12]), though there is some difference in that we are able to say 
that A's are (or are not) typical B's. We expect this expressiveness to be important for certain 
types of reasoning (e.g., reasoning by analogy). Our model does not require explicit statement 
of exceptions as Etherington's does in order to obtain default rather than strict behaviour. This 
may well make it simpler to specify large type schemas, where exceptions are not always directly 
obvious. 
Our model is at best awkward for dealing with disjunctions as the statement 'A or B' does not 
represent a point in the lattice of feature descriptors. This is an area which will almost certainly 
require more attention as we move on to more complex reasoning tasks. A related weakness 
is that it is not possible to specify prioritized, disjunct prototypes for a category. We cannot 
express, for example, that a student is usually an undergraduate, otherwise a masters tudent, 
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otherwise a Ph.D. student. Levesque's default logic [15,16] accomplishes this in an elegant man- 
ner, but apparently has problems in areas dealing with tangled hierarchies [17]. 
The model needs further work in order to explore its extension to inheritance of relations 
between classes. The author believes that such an extension is possible in a clean and simple 
manner. However, the detailed work has yet to be done. 
A major contribution of our model is that it is very simple, and deals correctly with many of 
the classical problem cases in inheritance [18]. It also sheds light on some controversial issues. 
The simplicity of the model and its similarity to proposed human cognitive representations are 
positive characteristics for use in an end-user system, where it must be relatively straightforward 
to build and modify type schemas for individual needs. 
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